Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
This article is about
Communist rule in Afghanistan (1978-1992).
The Communists take power, 1978
On April 27, 1978 a coup was initiated, reportedly by Hafizullah Amin while he was under house arrest. Mohammed Daoud Khan was killed the next day. The communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) gained control and on May 1 Nur Mohammed Taraki became President. The country was then renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), which lasted until 1992.
The PDPA had split into several factions in 1967, soon after its founding. Ten years later the efforts of the Soviet Union had brought back together the Khalq faction of Taraki and the Parcham faction of Babrak Karmal. The "Saur Revolution," as the new government labeled its coup d'etat, after the month in the Islamic calendar in which it occurred, was almost entirely the achievement of the Khalq faction of the PDPA. This success gave it effective control over the armed forces, a great\nadvantage over its Parchami rival. Khalq's victory was partially due to Daoud's miscalculation that Parcham was the more serious threat. Parcham's leaders had enjoyed widespread connections within the senior bureaucracy and even the royal family and the most privileged elite. These linkages also tended to make their movements easy to trace.
Khalq, on the other hand, had not been involved in Daoud's\ngovernment, had little connection with Kabul's Persian speaking elite, and a rustic reputation based on recruitment of students from the provinces. Most of them were Pashtuns, especially the Ghilzais. They had few apparent connections in the senior bureaucracy, many had taken jobs as school teachers. Khalq's influence at Kabul University was also limited.
These newcomers to Kabul had seemed poorly positioned to\npenetrate the government. Moreover, they were led by the erratic Mohammed Taraki, a poet, sometime minor official, and a publicly notorious radical. Confident that his military officers were reliable, Daoud must have discounted the diligence of Taraki's lieutenant, Hafizullah Amin, who had sought out dissident Pashtun officers. The bungling of Amin's arrest, which enabled him to trigger the coup ahead of its planned date, also suggests Khalq's penetration of Daoud's security police.
The organisers of the coup had carried out a bold and sophisticated plan. It employed the shock effect of a combined armored and air assault on the Arg or palace, the seat of Daoud's highly centralized government. Seizure of the initiative demoralized the larger loyal or uncommitted forces nearby. Quick capture of telecommunications, the defense ministry and other strategic centers of authority isolated Daoud's stubbornly resisting palace guard.
The coup was by far Khalq's most successful achievement. So\nmuch so, that a considerable literature has accumulated arguing that it must have been planned and executed by the KGB, or some special branch of the Soviet military. Given the friction that soon developed between Khalq and Soviet officials, especially over the purging of Parcham, Soviet control of the coup seems unlikely. Prior knowledge of it does appear to have been highly likely. Claims that Soviet pilots bombed the palace overlook the availability of seasoned Afghan pilots.
Political leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was asserted within three days of the military takeover. After thirteen years of conspiratorial activity, the two factions of the PDPA emerged in public, refusing at first, to admit their Marxist credentials. Khalq's dominance was quickly apparent. Taraki became president, prime minister and General Secretary of the PDPA. Parcham's leader, Babrak Karmal, and Amin were named deputy prime ministers. Cabinet membership was split eleven to ten , with Khalq in the majority. Khalq dominated the Revolutionary Council, which was to serve as the ruling body of the government. Within weeks purges of Parcham began and by summer Khalq's somewhat bewildered Soviet patrons became aware of how difficult it would be temper its radicalism. The destruction of Afghanistan's former ruling elite had begun immediately after the seizure of power. Execution (Parcham leaders later claimed at\nleast 11,000 during the Taraki/Amin period), flight into exile, and later the devastation of Kabul itself would literally remove the great majority of the some 100,000 who had come to form Afghanistan's elite and middle class. Their loss almost completely broke the continuity of Afghanistan's leadership, political institutions and their social foundation. Karmal was dispatched to Czechoslovakia as ambassador, along with others shipped out of the country. Amin appeared to be\nthe principal beneficiary of this strategy.
The Khalq leadership proved incapable of filling this vacuum. Its brutal and clumsy attempts to introduce radical changes in control over agricultural land holding and credit, rural social relations, marriage and family arrangements, and education led to scattered protests and uprisings among all major communities in the Afghan countryside. Taraki and Amin left a legacy of turmoil and resentment which gravely compromised later Marxist attempts\nto win popular acceptance.
Government was reconstructed in classical Leninist fashion. Until 1985 it was governed by a provisional constitution, "The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Supreme sovereignty was vested in a Revolutionary Council, originally a body of fifty-eight members whose number later varied. Its executive committee, the Presidium, exercised power when the council was not in formal session. The Revolutionary Council was presided over by the president of the Democratic Republic.
Beneath the council the cabinet functioned under a Prime\nMinister, essentially in a format inherited from the pre-Marxist era. Two new ministries were added: Islamic Affairs and Tribes and Nationalities. Administrative arrangements for provincial and sub-provincial government were also retained.
In Leninist style, the PDPA was closely juxtaposed with the\nformal instruments of government. Its authority was generated by its Central Committee, whose executive stand-in was its Politburo. Presiding over both was the party's secretary general. Policy generation was the primary function of the executive level of the party, which was to be carried out by its members serving throughout the government.
On 5 December 1978 a friendship treaty was signed with the Soviet Union and was later used as a pretext for the Soviet invasion. Major uprisings occurred regularly against the government. On 15 February 1979, the United States ambassador in Kabul, Adolph Dubs, was taken hostage and later killed when Amin ordered the police to attack. The US did not appoint a new ambassador.
In mid-March the 17th infantry division in Herat under the control of Ismail Khan mutinied in support of Shi'ite Muslims. A hundred Soviet advisors in the city, and their families, were killed. The city was bombed, causing massive destruction and thousands of deaths and later it was recaptured with Afghan army tanks and paratroopers.
Taraki visited Moscow on March 20, 1979 with a formal request for Soviet ground troops. Alexei Kosygin told him "we believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops... if our troops went in, the situation in your country... would get worse." Despite this statement Taraki negotiated some armed support - helicopter gunships with Russian pilots and maintenance crews, 500 military advisors, 700 paratroopers disguised as technicians to defend Kabul airport, also significant food aid (300,000 tons of wheat). Brezhnev still warned Taraki that full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies - both yours and ours."
During this period, many Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran and began organizing a resistance movement. Although the groups organizing in the city of Peshawar, Pakistan would later, after the Soviet invasion, be described by the western press as "freedom fighters"--as if their goal were to establish a representative democracy in Afghanistan--in reality these groups each had agendas of their own that were often far from democratic.
The intense rivalry between Taraki and Amin within the Khalq faction heated up. Amin became prime minister on 28 March 1979 with Taraki remaining President. In September 1979, Taraki's followers had made several attempts on Amin's life. However, it was Taraki who was overthrown and killed, with Amin assuming power in Afghanistan. The Soviets had at first backed Amin, but they realized that he was too rigidly Marxist-Leninist to survive politically in a country as conservative and religious as Afghanistan. The KGB in Kabul speculated that Amin's rule would be marked by "harsh repression and... [result in] the activation and strengthening of the opposition... The situation can only be saved by the removal of Amin from power."
Taraki's death was first noted in the Kabul Times on 10\nOctober, which reported that the former leader only recently hailed as the "great teacher... great genius... great leader" had died quietly "of serious illness, which he had been suffering for some time." Less than three months later, after the Amin government had been overthrown, the newly installed followers of Babrak Karmal gave another account of Taraki's death. According to this\naccount, Amin ordered the commander of the palace guard to have Taraki executed. Taraki reportedly was suffocated with a pillow over his head. Amin's emergence from the power struggle within the small divided communist party in Afghanistan alarmed the Soviets and would usher in the series of events which lead to the Soviet invasion.
In Kabul, the ascension of Amin to the top position was quick. Amin began unfinished attempts to moderate what many Afghans viewed as an anti-Islam regime. Promising more religious freedom, repairing mosques, presenting copies of the Qur'an to religious groups, invoking the name of Allah in his speeches, and declaring that the Saur Revolution was "totally based on the principles of Islam." Yet many Afghans held Amin responsible for the regime's harshest measures.
The Soviets established a special commission on Afghanistan, of KGB chairman Andropov, Ponomaryev from the Central Committee and Ustinov, the defence minister. In late October they reported that Amin was purging his opponents, including Soviet sympathisers; his loyalty to Moscow was false; and that he was seeking diplomatic links with Pakistan and possibly China.
Opposition forces
Outside observers usually identify the two warring groups as\n"fundamentalists" and "traditionalists." Rivalries between these\ngroups continued during the Afghan civil war that followed the\nSoviet withdrawal. The rivalries of these groups brought the\nplight of the Afghans to the attention of the West, and it was\nthey who received military assistance from the United States and\na number of other nations.
The fundamentalists based their organizing principle around\nmass politics and included several divisions of the\nJamiat-i-Islami. The leader of the parent branch,\nBurhanuddin Rabbani, began organizing in Kabul before repression\nof religious\nconservatives, which began in 1974, forced him to flee to\nPakistan during Daoud's\nregime. Perhaps best known among the\nleaders was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who broke with Rabbani to form\nanother resistance group, the Hizb-e-Islami, which became\nPakistan's favored arms recipient. Another split, engineered by\nYunus Khales, resulted in a second group using the name\nHizb-e-Islami--a group that was somewhat more moderate than\nHikmatyar's. A fourth fundamentalist group was the\nIttehad-i-Islami led by Rasool Sayyaf. Rabbani's group received\nits greatest support from northern Afghanistan where the best\nknown resistance commander in Afghanistan--Ahmad Shah Massoud--a\nTajik, like Rabbani, operated against the Soviets with\nconsiderable success.
The organizing principles of traditionalist groups differed\nfrom those of the fundamentalists. Formed from loose ties among\nulama in Afghanistan, the traditionalist leaders were\nnot concerned, unlike fundamentalists, with redefining Islam in\nAfghan society but instead focused on the use of the\nsharia as the source of law (interpreting the\nsharia is a principal role of the ulama). Among the\nthree groups in Peshawar, the most important was the\nJebh-e-Nejat-e-Milli led by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi. Some of the\ntraditionalists were willing to accept restoration of the\nmonarchy and looked to former King Mohammed Zahir Shah, exiled in\nItaly, as the ruler.
Other ties also were important in holding together some\nresistance groups. Among these were links within sufi\norders, such as the Mahaz-e-Milli Islami, one of the\ntraditionalist groups associated with the Gilani sufi\norder led by Pir Sayyid Gilani. Another group, the Shia Muslims\nof Hazarajat, organized the refugees in Iran.
The Soviet invasion, December 1979
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan began as midnight approached on December 24, 1979. They organised a massive military airlift into Kabul, involving an estimated 280 transport aircraft and 3 divisions of almost 8,500 men each. Within two days, they had secured Kabul,\ndeploying a special Soviet assault unit against Darulaman Palace, where elements of the Afghan army loyal to Hafizullah Amin put up a fierce, but brief resistance. With Amin's death at the palace, Babrak Karmal, exiled leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA was installed by the Soviets as Afghanistan's new head of government.
A number of theories have been advanced for the Soviet action. These interpretations of Soviet motives do not always agree -- what is known for certain is that the decision was influenced by many factors -- that in Leonid Brezhnev's words the decision to invade Afghanistan was truly "no simple decision." Two factors were certain to have figured heavily in Soviet calculations. The\nSoviet Union, always interested in establishing a "cordon\nsanitaire" of subservient or neutral states on its frontiers, was increasingly alarmed at the unstable, unpredictable situation on its southern border. Perhaps as important, the Brezhnev doctrine declared that the Soviet Union had a "right" to come to the assistance of an endangered fellow socialist country. Presumably Afghanistan was a friendly regime that could not survive against growing pressure from the resistance without direct assistance from the Soviet Union.
The government of Babrak Karmal faced crippling disabilities. Installation by a foreign power prevented popular acceptance of the legitimacy of his government. Even though the Parchamis, themselves, had been among the groups most viciously persecuted by the Khalqis, their identification with Marxism and Soviet repression was not forgiven. Indeed, the decimation of their members forced the Soviets to insist on reconciliation between the two factions. The purging of Parchamis had left the military forces so dominated by Khalqis that the Soviets had no choice but to rely upon Khalqi officers to rebuild the army.
Soviet miscalculation of what was required to crush Afghan\nresistance further aggravated the government's situation. The Afghan army was expected to carry the burden of suppressing opposition, which was to be done quickly with Soviet support. As the war of pacification dragged on for years, the Babrak Karmal government was further weakened by the poor performance of its army.
Whatever the Soviet goals may have been, the international\nresponse was sharp and swift. United States President\nJimmy Carter, reassessing the strategic situation in his State of the Union address in January, 1980, identified Pakistan as a "front-line state" in the global struggle against communism. He reversed his stand of a year earlier that aid to Pakistan be terminated as a result of its nuclear program and offered Pakistan a military and economic assistance package if it would\nact as a conduit for United States and other assistance to the mujahedin. Pakistani president Zia ul-Haq refused Carter's package but later a larger aid offer from the Reagan administration was accepted.\nQuestions about Pakistan's nuclear program were, for the time being, set aside. Assistance also came from the People's Republic of China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Also forth coming was international aid to help Pakistan deal with more than 3 million fleeing Afghan refugees.
The foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference deplored the invasion and demanded Soviet withdrawal at a meeting in Islamabad in January 1980. Action by the United Nations Security Council was impossible because the Soviets had veto power, but the United Nations General Assembly regularly passed resolutions opposing the Soviet occupation.
In mid-January 1980 the Soviets relocated their command post from Termez, on Soviet territory to the north of Afghanistan, to Kabul. For ten years the Soviets and their Afghan allies battled the mujahedin for control of the country. The Soviets used helicopters (including Mil Mi-24 Hind gunships) as their primary air attack force,\nsupported with fighter-bombers and bombers, ground troops and special forces. In some areas they conducted a scorched-earth campaign destroying villages, houses, crops, livestock etc.
The search for popular support
In attempts to broaden support, the PDPA created organizations\nand launched political initiatives intended to induce popular\nparticipation. The most ambitious was the National Fatherland\nFront (NFF), founded in June 1981. This umbrella organization\ncreated local units in cities, towns and tribal areas which were\nto recruit supporters of the regime. Village and tribal notables\nwere offered inducements to participate in well publicized\nrallies and programs. The party also gave affiliated\norganizations that enrolled women, youth and city workers high\nprofile exposure in national radio, television, and government\npublications.
From its beginnings in the mid-1960s, the membership of the\nPDPA had taken keen interest in the impact of information and\npropaganda. Some years after their own publications had been\nterminated by government, they gained control of all official\nmedia. These were energetically harnessed to their propaganda\ngoals. Anis, the mainline government newspaper\n(published in Pashto and Dari), the Kabul New Times\n(previously the Kabul Times), published in English, and\nsuch new publications as Haqiqat-i-Inqelab-i-Saur\nexhibited the regime's flair for propaganda. With Kabul as its\nprimary constituency, it also made innovative use of\ntelevision.
The early efforts at mobilizing popular support were later\nfollowed up by national meetings and assemblies, eventually using\na variation of the model of the traditional loya jirga to entice\nthe cooperation of rural secular leaders and religious\nauthorities. A large scale loya jirga was held in 1985 to ratify\nthe DRA's new constitution.
These attempts to win collaboration were closely coordinated\nwith efforts to manipulate Pashtun tribal politics. Such efforts\nincluded trying to split or disrupt tribes who affiliated with\nthe resistance, or by compromising notables into commitments to\nraise militia forces in service to the government.
A concerted effort was made to win over the principal\nminorities: Uzbeq, Turkoman, and Tajik, in northern Afghanistan.\nFor the first time their languages and literatures were\nprominently broadcast and published by government media. Minority\nwriters and poets were championed, and attention was given to\ntheir folk art, music, dance and lore.
Internal refugees: flight to the cities
As the Afghan-Soviet war became more destructive, internal\nrefugees flocked to Kabul and the largest of the provincial\ncities. Varying estimates (no authentic census was taken) put\nKabul's population at more than 2 million by the late 1980s. In\nmany instances villagers fled to Kabul and other towns to join\nfamily or lineage groups already established there.
At least 3, perhaps 4, million Afghans were thus subject to\ngovernment authority and hence exposed to PDPA recruitment or\naffiliation. Its largest membership claim was 160,000, starting\nfrom a base of between 5,000 and 10,000 immediately after the\nSoviet invasion. How many members were active and committed was\nunclear, but the lure of perquisites, for example, food and fuel\nat protected prices, compromised the meaning of membership.\nClaims of membership in the NFF ran into the millions, but its\ncore activists were mostly party members. When it was terminated\nin 1987, the NFF disappeared without impact.
Factionalism
The PDPA was also never able to rid itself of internal\nrivalries. Burdened by obvious evidence that the Soviets oversaw\nits policies, actively dominated the crucial sectors of its\ngovernment, and literally ran the war, the PDPA could not assert\nitself as a political force until after the Soviets left. In the\ncivil war period that followed, it gained significant respect,\nbut its internal disputes worsened.
Born divided, the PDPA suffered virtually continuous conflict\nbetween its two major factions. The Soviets imposed a public\ntruce upon Parcham and Khalq, but the rivalry continued with\nhostility and disagreement frequently rising to the surface.\nGenerally, Parcham enjoyed political dominance, while Khalq could\nnot be denied the leverage over the army held by its senior\nofficers. It was a marriage necessary for survival.
Social, linguistic, and regional origins and differing degrees\nof Marxist radicalism had spurred factionalism from the\nbeginning. When Soviet forces invaded, there was a fifteen-year\nhistory of disagreement, dislike, rivalry, violence and murder.\nEach new episode added further alienation. Events also tended to\nsub-divide the protagonists. Hafizullah Amin\nmurder of Taraki divided the\nKhalqis. Rival military cliques divided the Khalqis further.
Mohammad Najibullah, 1986-1992
Parchami suffered a series of splits when the Soviets\ninsisted on replacing Babrak Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah as head of the PDPA on May 4, 1986. The PDPA was riven by divisions which prevented implementation of policies and compromised its internal security.\nThese fundamental weaknesses were later partially masked by the urgency\nof rallying for common survival in the immediate aftermath of the\nSoviet withdrawal. Yet, after military successes rifts again\nbegan to surface.
Karmal retained the\npresidency for a while, but power had shifted to Najibullah, who had\npreviously headed the State Information Service (Khadamate Ettelaate\nDowlati--KHAD), the Afghan secret service agency. Najibullah tried to\ndiminish differences with the resistance and appeared prepared to\nallow Islam a greater role as well as legalize opposition groups, but\nany moves he made toward concessions were rejected out of hand by the\nmujahedin.
Factionalism had a critical impact on the leadership of the\nPDPA. Najibullah's achievements as a mediator between factions,\nan effective diplomat, a clever foe, a resourceful administrator\nand a brilliant spokesman who coped with constant and changing\nturmoil throughout his six years as head of government, qualified\nhim as a leader among Afghans. His leadership qualities might be\nsummarized as conciliatory authoritarianism: a sure sense of\npower, how to get it, how to use it, but mediated by willingness\nto give options to rivals. This combination was glaringly lacking\nin most of his colleagues and rivals.
Najibullah suffered, to a lesser degree, the same disadvantage\nthat Karmal had when he was installed as General Secretary of the\nPDPA by the Soviets. Despite Soviet interference and his own\nfrustration and discouragement over the failure to generate\nsubstantial popular support, Karmal still had retained enough\nloyalty within the party to remain in office. This fact was shown\nby the fierceness of the resistance to Najibullah's appointment\nwithin the Parcham faction. This split persisted, forcing\nNajibullah to straddle his politics between whatever Parchami\nsupport he could maintain and alliances he could win from the\nKhalqis.
Najibullah's reputation was that of a secret police\napparatchik with especially effective skills in disengaging\nGhilzai and eastern Pashtuns from the resistance.\nNajibullah was\nhimself a Ghilzai from the large Ahmedzai tribe. His selection by\nthe Soviets was clearly related to his success in running KHAD,\nthe secret police, more effectively than the rest of the DRA had\nbeen governed. His appointment thus, was not principally the\nresult of intra-party politics. It was related to crucial changes\nin the Soviet-Afghan war that would lead to the Soviet military\nwithdrawal.
The Soviet decision to withdraw, 1986-1988
The Soviets grossly underestimated the huge cost of the Afghan venture--described, in time, as the Soviet Union's Vietnam--to their state.
The peak of the fighting came in 1985-86. The Soviet forces launched their largest and most effective assaults on the mujahedin supply lines adjacent to Pakistan. Major campaigns had also forced the mujahedin into the defensive near Herat and Kandahar.
At the same time a sharp increase in military support for the mujahedin from the United States and Saudi Arabia allowed it to regain the guerilla war initiative. By late August 1986, the\nfirst FIM-92 Stinger ground-to-air missiles were used successfully. For nearly a year they would deny the Soviets and the Kabul government effective use of air power.
These shifts in momentum reinforced the inclination of the new\nMikhail Gorbachev government to view further escalation of the war as a\nmisuse of Soviet political and military capital. Such doubts had\ndeveloped prior to the decision to install Mohammad Najibullah. In April\n1985, one month after Gorbachev assumed the Soviet\nleadership, its May Day greeting to the Kabul government failed\nto refer to its "revolutionary solidarity" with the PDPA, a\nsignal in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric that their relationship had\nbeen downgraded. Several months later, Babrak Karmal suggested the\ninclusion of non-party members in the Revolutionary Council and\nthe promotion of a "mixed economy." These tentative concessions\ntoward non-Marxists won Soviet praise, but divergence in policy\nbecame obvious at the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist\nParty of the Soviet Union in February 1986. Gorbachev's "bleeding\nwound" speech hinted at a decision to withdraw "in the nearest\nfuture." In his own speech Karmal made no reference to\nwithdrawal. In early May he was replaced by Najibullah.
Najibullah was obliged to move toward the evolving Soviet\nposition with great caution. Karmal's followers could use any\nconcessions to non-Marxists or acceptance of a Soviet withdrawal\nagainst him. Accordingly, he moved in conflicting directions,\ninsisting there was no room for non-Marxists in government, only\noffering the possibility of clemency to "bandits" who had been\nduped by mujahedin leaders into resisting the government. In\naddition to air strikes and shelling across the border, KHAD\nterrorist activity in Pakistan reached its peak under\nNajibullah.
Late in 1986 Najibullah had stabilized his political position\nenough to begin matching Moscow's moves toward withdrawal. In\nSeptember he set up the National Compromise Commission to contact\ncounterrevolutionaries "in order to complete the Saur Revolution\nin its new phase." Allegedly some 40,000 rebels were contacted.\nIn November Karmal was replaced as now-ceremonial president by a\nnon-party member, Haji Muhammad Samkanai, signaling the PDPA's\nwillingness to open government to non-Marxists.
At the end of 1986 Najibullah unveiled a program of "National\nReconciliation." It offered a six-month cease-fire and\ndiscussions leading to a possible coalition government in which\nthe PDPA would give up its government monopoly. Contact was to be\nmade with "anti-state armed groups." Affiliation was suggested,\nallowing resistance forces to retain areas under their\ncontrol.
In fact much of the substance of the program was happening on\nthe ground in the form of negotiations with disillusioned\nmujahedin commanders who agreed to cooperate as government\nmilitia. The mujahedin leadership rhetorically claimed that the\nprogram had no chance for success. For his part Najibullah\nassured his followers that there would be no compromise over "the\naccomplishments" of the Saur Revolution. It remained a standoff.\nWhile a strenuous propaganda effort was directed at the both the\nAfghan refugees and Pakistanis in\nNorth-West Frontier,\nthe program was essentially a sop to Moscow's hope to\ntie a favorable political settlement to its desire to pull its\nforces out.
Najibullah's concrete achievements were the consolidation of\nhis armed forces, the expansion of co-opted militia forces and\nthe acceptance of his government by an increasing proportion of\nurban population under his control. As a propaganda ploy\n"National Reconciliation" was a means of gaining time to prepare\nfor civil war after the Soviet departure.
The Geneva accords, 1987-1989
By the beginning of 1987, the controlling fact in the Afghan war was the Soviet Union's determination to withdraw. It would not renege on its commitment to the Kabul government's survival--Mikhail Gorbachev's options were restricted by Soviet military insistence that Kabul not be abandoned. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership was convinced that resolution of Cold War issues with the West and internal reform were far more urgent than the fate of the Kabul government.
Other events outside Afghanistan, especially in the Soviet Union, contributed to the eventual agreement. The toll in casualties, economic resources, and loss of support at home increasingly felt in the Soviet Union was causing criticism of the occupation policy. Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982, and after two short-lived successors, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership in March 1985. As Gorbachev opened up the country's system, it became more clear that the Soviet Union wished to find a face-saving way to withdraw from Afghanistan.
The civil war in Afghanistan was guerrilla warfare and a war\nof attrition between government and the mujahedin; it cost both sides\na great deal. Many Afghans, perhaps as many as five million, or\none-quarter of the country's population, fled to Pakistan and\nIran where they organized into guerrilla groups to strike Soviet\nand government forces inside Afghanistan. Others remained in\nAfghanistan and also formed fighting groups; perhaps most notable\nwas one led by Ahmed Shah Massoud in the northeastern part of\nAfghanistan. These various groups were supplied with funds to\npurchase arms, principally from the United States, Saudi Arabia,\nPeople's Republic of China, and Egypt. Despite high casualties on both sides, pressure\ncontinued to mount on the Soviet Union, especially after the\nUnited States brought in FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles which\nseverely reduced the effectiveness of Soviet air cover.
Conveniently, a formula was readily available for minimizing\nthe humiliation of reversing a policy in which enormous\npolitical, material, and human capital had been invested. In 1982\nunder the auspices of the office of its secretary general, the UN\nhad initiated negotiations facilitating a Soviet withdrawal from\nAfghanistan. Its format had essentially been agreed upon by 1985.\nOstensibly it was the product of indirect negotiations between\nthe DRA and Pakistan (Pakistan did not recognize the DRA) with\nthe mediation of the secretary general's special representative,
Diego Cordovez. The United States and the Soviet Union had\ncommitted themselves to guaranteeing the implementation of an\nagreement leading to a withdrawal.
Both the format and the substance of the agreement were\ndesigned to be acceptable to the Soviet Union and the DRA. Its\nclauses included affirmation of the sovereignty of Afghanistan\nand its right to self-determination, its right to be free from\nforeign intervention or interference, and the right of its\nrefugees to a secure and honorable return. But at its core was an\nagreement reached in May 1988 that authorized the withdrawal of\n"foreign troops" according to a timetable that would remove all\nSoviet forces by February 15, 1989.
The accords emerged from initiatives by Moscow and Kabul in\n1981. They had claimed that Soviet forces had entered Afghanistan\nin order to protect it from foreign forces intervening on the\nside of rebels attempting to overthrow the DRA. The logic of the\nGeneva Accords was based on this accusation, that is, that once\nthe foreign threat to Afghanistan was removed, the forces of its\nfriend, the Soviet Union, would leave. For that reason a\nbilateral agreement between Pakistan, which was actively\nsupporting the resistance, and the DRA prohibiting intervention\nand interference between them was essential. In meticulous detail\neach party agreed to terminate any act that could remotely effect\nthe sovereignty or security of the other. This agreement included\npreventing an expatriate or a refugee from publishing a statement\nwhich his/her government could construe as a contribution to\nunrest within its territory. The bilateral agreement between the\nAfghanistan and Pakistan on the principles of non-interference\nand non-intervention was signed on April 14, 1988.
The accords thus facilitated a withdrawal by an erstwhile\nsuperpower, in a manner which justified an invasion. They\nexemplify the delicacy of UN diplomacy when the interests of a\ngreat power are engaged. In essence, the accords were a political\nbailout for a government struggling with the consequences of a\ncostly error. The UN could not insist that accusations of\nnational culpability were relevant to the negotiations. In the\ncase of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union insisted on its own\ndiplomatic terms as did the United States in a different manner\nconcerning Vietnam.
The agreement on withdrawal held, and on February 15, 1989, the last\nSoviet troops departed on schedule from Afghanistan. Their exit,\nhowever, did not bring either lasting peace or resettlement.
The failure to bring peace
The accords did not bring peace to Afghanistan. There was\nlittle expectation among its enemies or the Soviet Union that the\nKabul government would survive. Its refusal to collapse\nintroduced a three-year period of civil war.
The Geneva process failed to prevent the further carnage which a\npolitical solution among Afghans might have prevented or lessened. It\nfailed partially because the Geneva process prevented participation by\nthe Afghan resistance. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)\noccupied Afghanistan's seat at the\nUnited Nations General Assembly. Denied recognition, the\nresistance leadership resented the\ncentral role that DRA was permitted to play at Geneva. When the\nUnited Nations representative Diego Cordovez approached the\nmujahedin parties to discuss a possible political settlement in\nFebruary 1988--more than five years after negotiations began--they\nwere not interested. Their bitterness would hover over subsequent\nefforts to find a political solution.
Considerable diplomatic energy was expended throughout 1987 to\nfind a political compromise that would end the fighting before\nthe Soviets left. While Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the DRA\nhaggled over a timetable for the Soviet withdrawal, Cordovez\nworked on a formula for an Afghan government that would reconcile\nthe combatants. The formula involved Mohammed Zahir Shah, and by\nextension, the leading members of his former government, most of\nwhom had gone into exile. This approach also called for a meeting\nin the loya jirga tradition representing all Afghan protagonists\nand communities. It was to reach a consensus on the features of a\nfuture government. The jirgah also was to select a small group of\nrespected leaders to act as a transitional government in place of\nthe Kabul government and the mujahedin. During the transition a\nnew constitution was to be promulgated and elections conducted\nleading to the installation of a popularly accepted government.\nThis package kept re-emerging in modified forms throughout the\ncivil war that followed. Suggested roles for the king and his\nfollowers slipped into and out of these formulas, despite the\nimplacable opposition of most of the mujahedin leaders.
The peace prospect faltered because no credible consensus was\nattainable. By mid-1987 the resistance forces sensed a military\nvictory. They had stymied what proved to be the last set of major\nSoviet offensives, the Stinger missiles were still having a\ndevastating effect, and they were receiving an unprecedented\nsurge of outside assistance. Defeat of the Kabul government was\ntheir solution for peace. This confidence, sharpened by their\ndistrust of the UN virtually guaranteed their refusal of a\npolitical compromise.
Pakistan's attempt at a political solution, 1987-1988
Pakistan was the only protagonist in a position to convince\nthe mujahedin otherwise. Its intimate relationship with the\nparties it hosted had shaped their war and their politics. Their\ndependence on Pakistan for armaments, training, funding and\nsanctuary had been nearly total. But by 1987, the politics of\nPakistan's foreign policy had fragmented. The Foreign Ministry\nwas working with Diego Cordovez to devise a formula for a\n"neutral" government. President Zia ul-Haq was adamantly\nconvinced that a political solution favoring the mujahedin was\nessential and worked strenuously to convince the United States\nand the Soviet Union. Riaz Muhammad Khan argues that disagreement\nwithin the military and with Zia's increasingly independent prime\nminister, Muhammad Khan Junejo, deflected Zia's efforts. When\nMikhail Gorbachev announced a Soviet withdrawal without a peace\nsettlement at his Washington, D.C meeting with\nPresident Reagan on\nDecember 10, 1987, the chance for a political agreement was lost.\nAll the protagonists were then caught up in the rush to complete\nthe Geneva process.
In the end the Soviets were content to leave the possibilities\nof reconciliation to Najibullah and to shore him up with massive\nmaterial support. He had made an expanded reconciliation offer to\nthe resistance in July, 1987 including twenty seats in State\n(formerly Revolutionary) Council, twelve ministries and a\npossible prime minister-ship and Afghanistan's status as an Islamic\nnon-aligned state. Military, police, and security powers were not\nmentioned. The offer still fell far short of what even the\nmoderate mujahedin parties would accept.
Najibullah then reorganized his government to face the\nmujahedin alone. A new constitution took effect in November,\n1987. The name of the country was reverted to the Republic of\nAfghanistan, the State Council was\nreplaced by a National Assembly for which "progressive parties"\ncould freely compete. Mir Hussein Sharq, a non-party politician,\nwas named prime minister. Najibullah's presidency was given\nGaulist powers and longevity. He was promptly elected to a\nseven-year term. On paper, Afghan government appeared far more\ndemocratic than Mohammed Daoud Khan had left it, but its popular support\nremained questionable.
Stalemate: The Civil War, 1989-1992
The Soviet Union left Afghanistan deep in winter with intimations\nof panic among Kabul officials. Hard experience had convinced\nSoviet officials that the government was too faction riven to\nsurvive. Pakistani and United States\nofficials expected a quick\nmujahedin victory. The resistance was poised to attack provincial\ntowns and cities and eventually Kabul, if necessary. The first\none to fall might produce a ripple effect that would unravel the\ngovernment.
Within three months, these expectations were dashed at\nJalalabad. An initial assault penetrated the city's defenses and\nreached its airport. A counterattack, supported by effective\nartillery and air power, drove the mujahedin back. Uncoordinated\nattacks on the city from other directions failed. The crucial\nsupply road to the garrison from Kabul was reopened. By May 1989\nit was clear that the Kabul forces in Jalalabad had held.
The Mujahedin were traumatized by this failure. It exposed\ntheir inability to coordinate tactical movements or logistics or\nto maintain political cohesion. During the next three years, they\nwere unable to overcome these limitations. Only one significant\nprovincial capital, Taloqan, was captured and held. Mujahedin\npositions were expanded in the northeast and around Herat, but\ntheir inability to mass forces capable of overcoming a modern\narmy with the will to fight from entrenched positions was clear.\nA deadly exchange of medium-range rockets became the principal\nform of combat, embittering the urban population, and adding to\nthe obstacles that prevented millions of refugees from\nreturning.
Victory at Jalalabad dramatically revived the morale of the\nKabul government. Its army proved able to fight effectively\nalongside the already the hardened troops of the Soviet-trained\nspecial security forces. Defections decreased dramatically when\nit became apparent that the resistance was in disarray, with no\ncapability for a quick victory. The change in atmosphere made\nrecruitment of militia forces much easier. As many as 30,000\ntroops were assigned to the defense of Herat alone.
Immediately after the Soviet departure, Najibullah pulled down\nthe façade of shared government. He declared an emergency,\nremoved Sharq and the other non-party ministers from the cabinet.\nThe Soviet Union responded with a flood of military and economic\nsupplies. Sufficient food and fuel were made available for the\nnext two difficult winters. Much of the military equipment\nbelonging to Soviet units evacuating Eastern Europe was shipped\nto Afghanistan. Assured adequate supplies, Kabul's air force,\nwhich had developed tactics minimizing the threat from Stinger\nmissiles, now deterred mass attacks against the cities.\nMedium-range missiles, particularly the Scud, were successfully\nlaunched from Kabul in the defense of Jalalabad, 145 kilometres\nmiles away. One reached the suburbs of Pakistan's capital,\nIslamabad, more than 400 kilometres away. Soviet support reached\na value of $3,000,000,000 per year in 1990. Kabul had achieved a\nstalemate which exposed the mujahedin's weaknesses, political and\nmilitary.
The demise of the Soviet Union, 1991
With the failure of the communist hardliners to take over the\nSoviet government in August 1991,\nMohammad Najibullah's supporters in the\nSoviet Army lost their power to dictate Afghan policy. The effect\nwas immediate. On September 13, the Soviet government, now\ndominated by Boris Yeltsin, agreed with the United States on a\nmutual cut off of military aid to both sides in the Afghan civil\nwar. It was to begin January 1, 1992.
The post-coup Soviet government then attempted to develop\npolitical relations with the Afghan resistance. In mid-November\nit invited a delegation of the resistance's\nAfghanistan Interim Government (AIG) to Moscow where\nthe Soviets agreed that a transitional government should prepare\nAfghanistan for national elections. The Soviets did not insist\nthat Najibullah or his colleagues participate in the transitional\nprocess. Having been cut adrift both materially and politically,\nNajibullah's faction torn government began to fall apart.
During the nearly three years that the Kabul government had\nsuccessfully defended itself against mujahedin attacks, factions\nwithin the government had also developed quasi-conspiratorial\nconnections with its opponents. Even during the Soviet war Kabul's\nofficials had arranged case-fires, neutral zones, highway passage and\neven passes allowing unarmed mujahedin to enter towns and cities. As\nthe civil war developed into a stalemate in 1989, such arrangements\nproliferated into political understandings. Combat generally ceased\naround Kandahar because most of the mujahedin commanders had an\nunderstanding with its provincial governor. Ahmed Shah Massoud\ndeveloped an agreement with Kabul to keep the vital north-south\nhighway open after the Soviet withdrawal. The greatest mujahedin\nvictory during the civil war, the capture of Khost, was achieved\nthrough the collaboration of its garrison. In March 1990 \nGulbuddin Hekmatyar cooperated with an attempted coup by the\nKhalqi Defense minister Shah Nawaz Tanai: Hekmatyar's forces\nwere to attack Kabul simultaneously. The plot misfired because of faulty\ncommunications. Tanai escaped by helicopter to Pakistan where he was\ngreeted and publicly accepted as an ally by Hekmatyar.
Interaction with opponents became a major facet of\nNajibullah's defensive strategy, Many mujahedin groups were\nliterally bought off with arms, supplies and money to become\nmilitias defending towns, roads and installations. Such\narrangements carried the danger of backfiring. When Najibullah's\npolitical support ended and the money dried up, such allegiances\ncrumbled.
The fall of Kabul, April 1992
Kabul ultimately fell to the mujahedin because the factions in\nits government had finally pulled it apart. Until demoralized by\nthe defections of its senior officers, the army had achieved a\nlevel of performance it had never reached under direct Soviet\ntutelage. It was a classic case of loss of morale. The regime\ncollapsed while it still possessed material superiority. Its\nstockpiles of munitions and planes would provide the victorious\nmujahedin with the means of waging years of highly destructive\nwar. Kabul was short of fuel and food at the end of winter in\n1992, but its military units were supplied well enough to fight\nindefinitely. They did not fight because their leaders were\nreduced to scrambling for survival. Their aid had not only been\ncut off, the Marxist-Leninist ideology that had provided the\ngovernment its rationale for existence been repudiated at its\nsource.
A few days after it was clear that Najibullah had lost\ncontrol, his army commanders and governors arranged to turn over\nauthority to resistance commanders and local notables throughout\nthe country. Joint councils or shuras were immediately\nestablished for local government in which civil and military\nofficials of the former government were usually included. Reports\nindicate the process was generally amicable. In many cases prior\narrangements for transferring regional and local authority had\nbeen made between foes.
These local arrangements generally remained in place in most of\nAfghanistan until at least 1995 . Disruptions occurred where local\npolitical arrangements were linked to the struggle\nthat developed between the mujahedin parties. At the national\nlevel a political vacuum was created and into it fell the expatriate\nparties in their rush to take control. The enmities, ambitions,\nconceits and dogmas which had paralysed their shadow government proved\nto be even more disastrous in their struggle for power. The traits\nthey brought with them had been accentuated in the struggle for\npreferment in Peshawar.
Collusions between military leaders quickly brought down the\nKabul government. In mid-January 1992, within three weeks of\ndemise of the Soviet Union, Ahmed Shah Massoud was aware of\nconflict within the government's northern command. General\nAbdul Momim, in charge of the Hairatan border crossing at the northern\nend of Kabul's supply highway, and other non-Pashtun generals\nbased in Mazar-e Sharif feared removal by Najibullah and\nreplacement by Pashtun officers. The generals rebelled and the\nsituation was taken over by Abdul Rashid Dostam, who held general\nrank as head of the Jozjani militia, also based in\nMazar-e Sharif. He and Massoud reached a political agreement,\ntogether with another major militia leader, Sayyid Mansor, of the\nIsmaili community based in Baghlan province. These northern\nallies consolidated their position in Mazar-e Sharif on March 21.\nTheir coalition covered nine provinces in the north and\nnortheast. As turmoil developed within the government in Kabul,\nthere was no government force standing between the northern\nallies and the major air force base at Bagram, some seventy\nkilometres north of Kabul. By mid-April the air force command at\nBegram had capitulated to Massoud. Kabul was defenseless, its\narmy was no longer reliable.
Najibullah had lost internal control immediately after he\nannounced his willingness on March 18 to resign in order to make\nway for a neutral interim government. As the government broke\ninto several factions the issue had become how to carry out a\ntransfer of power. Najibullah attempted to fly out of Kabul on\nApril 17, but was stopped by Dostam's troops who controlled Kabul\nAirport under the command of Babrak Karmal's brother,\nMahmud Baryalai.\nVengeance between Parchami factions was reaped. Najibullah took\nsanctuary at the UN mission where he remained until 1996. A group of\nParchami generals and officials declared themselves an interim\ngovernment for the purpose of handing over power to the\nmujahedin.
For more than a week Massoud remained poised to move his\nforces into the capital. He was awaiting the arrival of political\nleadership from Peshawar. The parties suddenly had sovereign\npower in their grasp, but no plan for executing it. With his\nprincipal commander prepared to occupy Kabul, Burhanuddin Rabbani was\npositioned to prevail by default. Meanwhile UN mediators tried to\nfind a political solution that would assure a transfer of power\nacceptable to all sides.
The United Nations plan for political accommodation
Benan Sevan, Diego Cordovez's successor as special\nrepresentative of the UN secretary general, attempted to apply a\npolitical formula that had been announced by UN Secretary General\nJavier Perez De Cuellar on May 21, 1991. Referred to as a\nfive-point plan, it included: recognition of Afghanistan's\nsovereign status as a politically non-aligned Islamic state;\nacceptance of the right of Afghans to self-determination in\nchoosing their form of government and social and economic\nsystems; need for a transitional period permitting a dialogue\nbetween Afghans leading to establishment of a government with\nwidely based support; the termination of all foreign arms\ndeliveries into Afghanistan; funding from the international\ncommunity adequate to support the return of Afghanistan's\nrefugees and its reconstruction from the devastation of war.
These principles were endorsed by the Soviet Union and the\nUnited States and Afghanistan's neighboring governments, but\nthere was no military means of enforcing it. The three moderate\nPeshawar parties accepted it, but it was opposed by\nGulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani,\nRasool Sayyaf and Mawlawi Yunis Khalis\nwho held out for a total victory over the Kabul government.
Nevertheless, these four "fundamentalists" found it politic to\nparticipate in the effort to implement the UN initiative.\nPressure from their foreign supporters and the opportunities that\nparticipation offered to modify or obstruct the plan encouraged\nthem to be reluctant players. Pakistan and Iran worked jointly to\nwin mujahedin acceptance at a conference in July, 1991.\nIndicating its formal acceptance of the plan, Pakistan officially\nannounced the termination of its own military assistance to the\nresistance in late January 1992. Najibullah\nalso declared his\nacceptance, but until March 18, 1992, he hedged the question of\nwhether or when he would resign in the course of\nnegotiations.
Sevan made a strenuous effort to create the mechanism for the\ndialogue that would lead to installation of the transitional\nprocess envisaged in point three of the plan. The contemplated\narrangement was a refinement and a simplification of earlier\nplans which had been built around the possible participation of\nMohammed Zahir Shah and the convoking of a meeting in the\nloya jirga tradition. By March 1992 the\nplan had evolved to the holding of a\nmeeting in Europe of some 150 respected Afghans representing all\ncommunities in the late spring. Most of Sevan's effort was\ndirected at winning the cooperation of all the Afghan\nprotagonists, including the Shia parties in control of the\nHazarajat. In early February, he appeared to have won the active\nsupport of commanders among the Pashtuns in eastern Afghanistan\nand acquiescence from Rabbani and Hekmatyar to the extent of\nsubmitting lists of participants acceptable to them in the\nproposed meeting. Simultaneously, Sevan labored to persuade\nNajibullah to step down on the presumption that his removal would\nbring about full mujahedin participation. Instead, Najibullah's\nMarch 18 announcement accelerated the collapse of his government.\nThis collapse in turn triggered events that moved faster than\nSevan's plan could be put into effect.
In the midst of hectic manoeuvring to put the European meeting\ntogether, Sevan declared on April 4 that most of the parties\n(including Hekmatyar's) and the Kabul government had agreed to\ntransfer power to a proposed transitional authority. He also\nannounced the creation of a "pre-transition council" to take\ncontrol of government "perhaps within the next two weeks." He was struggling to keep up with events which threatened to dissolve the government before he had a replacement for it.
In the end, some of the Shia parties and the Islamists in Peshawar blocked his scheme. They withheld their choices or submitted candidates for the European meeting whom they knew would be unacceptable to others. The hope for a neutral, comprehensive approach to a political settlement among Afghans was dashed. Sevan then worked to ensure a peaceful turnover of power from the interim Kabul government which replaced Najibullah on April 18 to the forces of Massoud and Dostam. In effect, the turnover was peaceful, but without an overall political settlement in place. Within a week a new civil war would begin among the victors as the era of the Islamic State of Afghanistan began.
References
\n*Soviet Air Power: Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan by Lieutenant Colonel Denny R. Nelson \n*Library of Congress Country Study of Afghanistan\n*The Cold War international history project - Soviet Documents
