Trench warfareTrench warfare is a form of war in which both opposing armies have static lines of fortifications dug into the ground, facing each other. Trench warfare arose when there was a revolution in firepower without similar advances in mobility and communications. Periods of trench warfare occurred during the American Civil War (1860s) and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and reached peak brutality and bloodshed on the Western Front in the First World War.
During the day, snipers and artillery observers in balloons made movement perilous so the trenches were mostly quiet. Consequently, the trenches were busiest at night when cover of darkness allowed the movement of troops and supplies, the maintenance and expansion of the barbed wire and trench system, and reconnaissance of the enemy's defences. Sentries in listening posts out in no man's land would try to detect enemy patrols and working parties or indications that an attack was being prepared.
Raids were carried out in order to capture prisoners and "booty" — letters and other documents that provide intelligence about the unit occupying the opposing trenches. As the war progressed, raiding became part of the general British policy, the intention being to maintain the fighting spirit of the troops and to deny no man's land from the Germans. Such dominance was achieved at a high cost and a post-war British analysis concluded that the benefits were probably not worth the price.
Early in the war, surprise raids would be mounted, particularly by the Canadianss, but increased vigilance made achieving surprise difficult as the war progressed. By 1916, raids were carefully planned exercises in combined arms and involved close cooperation of infantry and artillery. A raid would begin with an intense artillery bombardment designed to drive off or kill the front trench garrison and cut the barbed wire. Then the bombardment would shift to form a "box", or cordon, around a section of the front line to prevent a counter-attack intercepting the raid.
Death in the trenchesThe intensity of World War I trench warfare meant that about 10% of the fighting soldiers were killed. This compared to 5% killed during the Boer War and 4.5% killed during World War II. For British and dominion troops serving on the Western Front, the proportion of killed was 12% while the total proportion of troops who became casualties (killed or wounded) was 56%. Considering that for every front-line infantryman there were about 3 soldiers in support (artillery, supply, medical, etc.) it was highly unlikely for a fighting soldier to survive the war without sustaining some form of injury. Indeed many soldiers were injured more than once during the course of their service. Medical services were primitive and life-saving antibiotics undiscovered. Relatively minor injuries could prove fatal through the onset of infection and gas gangrene. The Germans recorded that 12% of leg wounds and 23% of arm wounds resulted in death, mainly through infection. The Americans recorded that 44% of casualties that developed gangrene died. Half of those who were wounded in the head died and only 1% of those wounded in the abdomen survived. Three quarters of the wounds inflicted during the war came from shell fire. The wound resulting from a shell fragment was usually more traumatic than a gunshot wound. A shell fragment would often introduce debris making it more likely that the wound would become infected. These factors meant that a soldier was three times more likely to die from a shell wound to the chest than from a gunshot wound. The blast from shell explosions could also kill by concussion. In addition to the physical effects of shell fire there was the psychological damage. Men who had to endure a prolonged bombardment would often suffer debilitating shell shock, a condition that was not well understood at the time. As in many other wars, World War I's greatest killer was disease. Sanitary conditions in the trenches were quite poor, and common infections included dysentery, typhus, and cholera. Many soldiers suffered from parasites and related infections. Poor hygiene also led to conditions such as trench mouth and trench foot. Another common killer was exposure, since the temperature within a trench in the winter could easily fall below zero degrees celsius. Burial of the dead was usually a luxury that neither side could easily afford. The bodies would lie in no man's land until the front line moved, by which time the bodies were often unidentifiable. On some battlefields, such as at the Nek in Gallipoli, the bodies were not buried until after the war. On the Western Front, bodies continue to be found as fields are ploughed and building foundations dug.
At various times during the war—particularly early on—official truces were organised so that the wounded could be recovered from no man's land and the dead could be buried. Generally though, the higher commands disapproved of any slackening of the offensive for humanitarian reasons and so ordered their troops not to permit enemy stretcher bearers to operate in no man's land. However, this order was almost invariably ignored by the soldiers in the trenches, who knew that it was to the mutual benefit of the fighting men of both sides to allow the wounded to be retrieved. So, as soon as hostilities ceased, parties of stretcher bearers, marked with red cross flags, would go out to recover the wounded, sometimes swapping enemy wounded for their own. There were occasions when this unofficial cease fire was exploited to conduct a reconnaissance or to reinforce or relieve a garrison.
Weapons of trench warfareInfantry weaponsThe common infantry soldier had three weapons at his disposal in the trenches: the rifle, bayonet, and grenade. The standard British rifle was the .303 Short Magazine Lee-Enfield, which was originally developed as a cavalry carbine and had an effective range of 1400 yards, though in the hands of the average soldier, 200 yards was about the limit of accurate fire. British infantry training emphasised rapid fire rifle shooting rather than accuracy. Early in the war, the British were able to defeat German attacks at Mons and the First Battle of Ypres using massed rifle fire, but as trench warfare developed, opportunities to assemble a line of riflemen became rare. The British soldier was equipped with a 21-inch sword bayonet, which was too long and unwieldy to be particularly effective in close quarters combat. However, bayonet use was safer than firing the rifle which, in a melee, might strike an ally instead of an enemy. British figures recorded that only 0.3% of wounds were caused by bayonets, however, a strike from a bayonet was highly likely to result in death. A bayonet charge could be effective at inducing terror in an opponent, encouraging them to flee or surrender. The bayonet was used to finish off wounded enemy during an advance, saving ammunition while reducing the possibility of being attacked from the rear. Many soldiers preferred a short handled spade or entrenching tool over a bayonet. They would sharpen the blade to a knife edge so it was just as effective as a bayonet and the shorter length made them handier to use in the confined quarters of the trenches. These tools could then be used to "dig in" after they had taken a trench. The grenade came to be the primary infantry weapon of trench warfare. Both sides were quick to raise specialist bombing squads. The grenade enabled a soldier to engage the enemy indirectly (without exposing himself to fire) and it did not require the precise accuracy of rifle fire in order to kill or maim. The Germans and Turks were well equipped with grenades from the start of the war, but the British, who had ceased using grenadiers in the 1870s, entered the war with virtually none, such that soldiers had to improvise bombs with whatever was available. By late 1915, the British Mills bomb had entered wide circulation, and by the end of the war 75 million of them had been used.Machine gunsThe machine gun is perhaps the signature weapon of trench warfare, with the image of ranks of advancing infantry being scythed down by the withering hail of bullets. The Germans embraced the machine gun from the outset -- in 1904, every regiment was equipped with one machine gun -- and the machine gun crews were the elite infantry units. After 1915, the MG 08/15 was the standard-issue German light machine gun; its number entered the German language as an idiomatic expression for "dead plain". At Gallipoli and in Palestine the Turks provided the infantry, but it was usually Germans who manned the machine guns. The British high command were less enthusiastic about machine gun technology, considering the weapon "unsporting", and they always lagged behind the Germans in adopting the weapon. However, by 1917, every company in the British forces was equipped with four Lewis guns, which significantly enhanced their firepower.
The heavy machine gun was a specialist weapon, and in a static trench system was employed in a scientific manner, with carefully calculated fields of fire, so that at a moment's notice an accurate burst could be laid upon the enemy's parapet or at a break in the wire. The British water-cooled Vickers machine gun required a 16 man crew and cost £30 a minute to operate. Each belt of ammunition had to be hand loaded with 250 rounds and the barrel of the gun had to be changed after two belts were fired. It was a fragile and difficult weapon to maintain and operate, but was very effective.
MortarsMortarss, which lobbed a shell a relatively short distance, were widely used in trench fighting for harassing the forward trenches and for cutting wire in preparation for a raid or attack. In 1914, the British fired a total of 545 mortar shells. In 1916, they fired over 6,500,000 shells. The main British mortar was the Stokes mortar, which was the precursor of the modern mortar. It was a light mortar, but was easy to use, and capable of a rapid rate of fire by virtue of the propellant cartridge being attached to the shell. To fire the Stokes mortar, the round was simply dropped into the tube, where the cartridge was ignited automatically when it struck the firing pin at the bottom. The Germans used a range of mortars. The smallest were grenade-throwers\n(granatenwerfer) which fired "pineapple" bombs. Their medium trench-mortars were called mine-throwers (minenwerfer), dubbed "minnies" by the British. The heavy mortar was called the ladungswerfer which threw "aerial torpedoes", containing a 200 lb (90 kg) charge, over 1000 yards. The flight of the missile was so slow and leisurely that the men on the receiving end could make some attempt to seek shelter.ArtilleryArtillery dominated the battlefield of trench warfare in the same way the air power dominates the modern battlefield. An infantry attack was rarely successful if it advanced beyond the range of its supporting artillery. In addition to bombarding the enemy infantry in the trenches, the artillery would engage in counter-battery duels to try to destroy the enemy's guns. Artillery mainly fired shrapnel, high explosives or, later in the war, gas shells. The British experimented with firing incendiary "thermite" shells to set trees and ruins alight.
Artillery pieces were of two types; guns and howitzers. Guns fired high velocity shells over a flat trajectory and were often used to deliver\nshrapnel and to cut barbed wire. Howitzers lofted the shell over a high\ntrajectory such that it plunged into the ground. The biggest artillery\nwere usually howitzers. The German 420 howitzer weighed 20 tons and could\nfire a one ton shell over six miles.
A critical feature of modern artillery pieces was the hydraulic recoil mechanism which meant that the gun did not need to be re-aimed after each shell was fired. Initially each gun would need to register its aim on a known target, in view of an observer, in order to fire with precision during a battle. The process of gun registration would often alert the enemy that an attack was being planned. Towards the end of 1917, artillery techniques were developed enabling guns to be aimed accurately without the need for registration.
GasTear gas was first employed in January 1915 but this could only disable the enemy. In April 1915, chlorine was first used. A large enough dose could kill but the gas was easy to detect by scent and sight. Those that were not killed on exposure could suffer permanent lung damage. Phosgene, first used in December 1915, was the ultimate killing gas of World War I -- it was 18 times more powerful than chlorine and much more difficult to detect. However, the most effective gas was mustard gas, introduced in July 1917. Mustard gas was not as fatal as phosgene but it was hard to detect and lingered on the surface of the battlefield and so could inflict casualties over a long period. The burns it produced were so horrific that a casualty resulting from mustard gas exposure was unlikely to be fit to fight again. Only 2% of mustard gas casualties died, mainly from secondary infections. The first method of employing gas was by releasing it from a cylinder when the wind was favourable. Such an approach was obviously prone to miscarry if the direction of the wind was misjudged. Also the cylinders needed to be positioned in the front trenches where they were liable to be ruptured during a bombardment. Later in the war, gas was delivered by artillery or mortar shell.OtherThe fundamental purpose of the aircraft in trench warfare was reconnaissance and artillery observation. The role of the fighter was to protect his own reconnaissance aircraft and to destroy those of the enemy, or at least deny them the freedom of his airspace. This involved achieving air superiority over the battlefield by destroying the enemy's fighters as well. Spotter aircraft would monitor the fall of shells during registration of the artillery. Reconnaissance aircraft would photograph trench lines, monitor enemy troop movements, and locate enemy artillery batteries so that they could be destroyed with counter-battery fire. The Germans employed flame throwers (flammenwerfer) during the war but the technology was not mature so they were more effective at inducing terror than inflicting casualties.MiningAll sides would engage in vigorous mining and counter-mining duels. The dry chalk of the Somme was especially suited to mining but with the aid of pumps it was also possible to mine in the sodden clay of Flanders. Specialist tunnelling companies, usually made up of men who had been coal miners in civilian life, would dig tunnels under no man's land and beneath the enemy's trenches. These mines would then be packed with explosives and detonated, producing a large crater. The crater served two purposes; it could destroy or breach the enemy's trench and, by virtue of the raised lip that they produced, could provide a ready-made "trench" closer to the enemy's line. When a mine was detonated, both sides would race to occupy and fortify the crater. If the miners detected an enemy tunnel in progress, they would often drive a counter-tunnel, called a camouflet, which would be detonated in an attempt to destroy the other tunnel prematurely. Night raids were also conducted with the sole purpose of destroying the enemy's mine workings. The British detonated a number of mines on July 1, 1916, the first day of the Battle of the Somme. The largest mines—the Y Sap Mine and the Lochnager Mine—each containing 24 tons of explosives, were blown near La Boiselle, throwing earth 4,000 feet into the air. At 5.10 am on June 7, 1917, 19 mines were detonated by the British to launch the Battle of Messines. The average mine contained 21 tons of explosive and the largest, 125 feet beneath St. Eloi, was twice the average at 42 tons. The combined force of the explosions was supposedly felt in England. As the Chief of Staff of the British Second Army, General Sir Charles Harrington, commented on the eve of the battle:
Trench battlesStrategyThe fundamental strategy of trench warfare was attrition; the process of progressively grinding down the opposition's resources until, ultimately, they are no longer able to wage war. This did not prevent the ambitious commander from pursuing the strategy of annihilation—the ideal of an offensive battle which produces victory in one decisive engagement. The British commander, General Douglas Haig, was constantly seeking a "breakthrough" which he could exploit with his cavalry divisions. His major trench offensives—the Somme in 1916 and Flanders in 1917—were conceived as breakthrough battles but both degenerated into costly attrition. The Germans actively pursued a strategy of attrition in the Battle of Verdun, the sole purpose of which was to "bleed the French Army white".TacticsThe popular image of a trench warfare infantry assault is of a wave of soldiers, bayonets fixed, going "over the top" and marching in a line across no man's land into a hail of enemy fire. This indeed was the standard method early in the war and successful examples are few. The more common tactic was to attack at night from an advanced post in no man's land, having cut the barbed wire entanglements beforehand. In 1917, the Germans innovated with the "infiltration" tactic where small groups of highly trained and well equipped troops would attack vulnerable points and bypass strong points, driving deep into the rear areas. The distance they could advance was still limited by their ability to supply and communicate.
The role of artillery in an infantry attack was twofold; firstly in preparation by killing or driving off the enemy garrison and destroying his defences, and secondly in protecting the attacking infantry by providing an impenetrable "barrage" or curtain of shells to prevent an enemy counter-attack. The first attempt at sophistication was the "lifting barrage" where the first objective of an attack was intensely bombarded for a period before the entire barrage "lifted" to fall on a second objective further back. However, this usually expected too much of the infantry and the usual outcome was that the barrage would outpace the attackers, leaving them without protection. This resulted in the use of the "creeping barrage" which would lift more frequently but in smaller steps, sweeping the ground ahead and moving so slowly that the attackers could usually follow closely behind it.
Capturing the objective was half the successful battle—the battle was only won if the objective was held. The attacking force would have to advance with not only the weapons required to capture a trench but also the tools—sandbags, picks & shovels, barbed wire— to fortify and defend from counter-attack. The Germans placed great emphasis on immediately counter-attacking to regain lost ground. This strategy cost them dearly in 1917 when the British started to limit their advances so as to be able to meet the anticipated counter-attack from a position of strength.
CommunicationsThe main difficulty faced by an attacking force in a trench battle was reliable communications. Wireless communications were still in their infancy so the available methods were telephone, semaphore, signal lamps, carrier pigeons and runners, none of which were particularly reliable. Telephone was the most effective but the lines were extremely vulnerable to shell fire so would usually be cut early in a battle. In an attempt to counter this, telephone lines would be laid in a ladder pattern to provide multiple redundant paths. Flares and rockets were used to signal an objective was reached or to call for pre-arranged artillery support. It was not unusual for a battalion or brigade commander to wait 2 or 3 hours for word on the progress of an attack, by which time any decision made based on the message would probably be long out of date. A similar period would pass when transferring the news to the division, corps and army headquarters. Consequently the outcome of many trench battles were decided by the company and platoon commanders in the thick of the fighting.ObsolescenceThe new tactic of trench warfare had come about as a response to the new technologies of rapid-fire weapons and mass-produced barbed wire. In consequence it is often thought that the end of trench warfare was itself brought about by new technologies, in particular the tank. Tanks were certainly a significant factor; however until quite late in the war they were available in only small numbers, and were often mis-employed by generals who had (of course) not yet gained experience with them. Soon after the war, analysts on both sides were highly motivated to exaggerate the role of the tank in ending trench warfare. For the Germans, it provided a ready explanation for their loss of the war; for ambitious Allied soldiers keen to see a large and independent tank corps (notably J.F.C. Fuller and George Patton), stressing the importance of the tank was a way to achieve political goals; and for analysts in general, the tank provided a ready technological explanation where none of the other contemporary changes in military hardware seemed to fit—aircraft, gas, vastly more powerful artillery, and improved communications could not easily be understood to have made the difference. In fact, the tank was only a partial explanation for the demise of trench warfare. Many Allied victories from 1917 on were achieved without tanks, or with very few of them, and the Germans too made large gains in early 1918 despite having hardly any tanks at all. The key lesson—which German tacticians learned all too well, and taught to their Allied pupils in the Blitzkrieg of 1940—was not technological but tactical. The keys to breaking the stalemate of trench warfare were to achieve tactical surprise, to attack the weakest parts of an enemy's line and bypass his strongpoints, and to abandon the futile attempt to have a grand and detailed plan of operations and control it from afar, instead relying on small, autonomous combined arms groups of well-trained soldiers, known as stormtroopers where the junior leaders on the spot could exercise initiative. The tank made it more difficult to defend a trench line. Combined arms warfare, where infantry, light artillery, and (if possible) tanks and aircraft operated in close cooperation made trench warfare obsolete. However, its obsolescence was not completely recognized by many armies, such as that of France who had spent considerable effort at defensive works including the Maginot Line which was quickly outflanked in the early stages of World War II. Although World War II was to be a much more mobile war than World War I, one of the legacies of trench warfare was the large amount of firepower available across a continuous, now mobile front. This development tremendously increased the destructiveness of war in the 20th century as compared with the 18th or 19th. In addition the tactical advances that made trench war obsolete has also greatly influenced warfare. The basis of modern land warfare remains based in semi-autonomous small teams such as the fire team and still places a large emphasis on rapid communication and allowing smaller units to exercise initiative.Recent trench warfareTrench warfare has been very infrequent since the end of World War I. When two large armored armies meet, the result has generally been the type of mobile warfare found in World War II. When one side has an overwhelming conventional military advantage, the result has generally been guerrilla warfare. The most cited example of trench warfare after World War I was the Iran-Iraq War in which both armies had large infantry with modern small arms, but very little armor, aircraft or training in combined weapons. The result was very similar to World War I with trenches and chemical warfare used. The technological obsolescence of this form of warfare was shown in the First Gulf War in 1991 when Iraq attempted to use static trench warfare tactics against the American army, resulting in a massive military defeat. In the First Gulf War, the American army was able to penetrate most of the Iraqi static lines through the use of air power using the doctrine of air land warfare.Resources\n* Death's Men: Soldiers of the Great War, Denis Winter, 1978, ISBN 0-14-016822-2See also\n* Passchendaele\n* Wire obstacle\n* Wire entanglementExternal links\n*Sanctuary Wood Museum\n*BBC reconstruction of life in the trenches\n*The Diggers\n Category:Fortification Category:Warfare Category:Military terms Category:Subterranea Category:Wikipedia Featured Articles |
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"Hell is a half-filled auditorium." - Robert Frost (1874-1963) |
Early in the war the British defensive doctrine suggested a main trench system of three parallel lines with each line connected by communications trenches. The point at which a communications trench intersected the front trench was of critical importance and was usually heavily fortified. The front trench was lightly garrisoned and typically only occupied in force during "stand to" at dawn and dusk. Between 70 and 100 yards behind the front trench was located the support (or "travel") trench to which the garrison would retreat when the front trench was bombarded. Between 300 and 500 yards further to the rear was located the third reserve trench where the reserve troops could amass for a counter-attack if the front trenches were captured. This defensive layout was soon rendered obsolete as the power of the artillery grew; however in certain sectors of the front, the support trench was maintained as a decoy to attract the enemy bombardment away from the front and reserve lines. Fires were lit in the support line to make it appear inhabited and any damage due to shellfire was immediately repaired.
Temporary trenches were also built. When a major attack was planned, assembly trenches would be dug near the front trench. These were used to provide a sheltered place for the waves of attacking troops who would follow the first waves leaving from the front trench. "Saps" were temporary, unmanned, often dead-end, utility trenches dug out into no man's land. They fulfilled a variety of purposes such as connecting the front trench to a listening post close to the enemy wire or providing an advanced "jumping-off" line for a surprise attack.
When one side's front line bulged towards the opposition, a "
Trenches were never straight but were dug in a square-toothed pattern that broke the line into bays connected by traverses. This meant that a soldier could never see more than 10 metres or so along the trench, consequently the entire trench could not be enfiladed if the enemy gained access at one point or if a bomb or shell landed in the trench, the shrapnel could not travel far. The side of the trench facing the enemy was called the parapet and had a fire step. The rear of the trench was called the parados. The parados protected the soldier's back from shrapnel from shells falling behind the trench. If the enemy captured the trench then the parados would become their "parapet". The sides of the trench were revetted with sandbags, wooden frames and wire mesh. The floor of the trench was usually covered by wooden duckboards.
Dugouts of varying degrees of luxury would be built in the rear of the support trench. British dugouts were usually 8 to 16 feet deep, whereas German dugouts were typically much deeper, usually a minimum of 12 feet deep and sometimes dug 3 stories down with concrete staircases to reach the upper levels.
using a periscope rifle, Gallipoli 1915]]
To allow a soldier to see out of the trench without exposing his head, a loophole would be built into the parapet. A loophole might simply be a gap in the sandbags or it might be fitted with a steel plate. German snipers used armor-piercing bullets that allowed them to penetrate loopholes. The other means to see over the parapet was the trench 
The battlefield of 
Battlefield features could be given a descriptive name ("Polygon Wood" near 
